When I posted about the EU referendum polls yesterday (and updated this blog's Poll of Polls), I somehow managed to miss the big polling story of the day - that YouGov had conducted side-by-side online and phone polls to test a theory about what might be causing the discrepancy between the findings produced by each method, and that both polls had shown a small Leave lead. This is just the second time in the whole campaign that a phone poll has reported an outright lead for Leave. It only seems to have happened because YouGov were especially persistent in trying to contact potential telephone respondents, and as a result eventually managed to speak to enough non-graduates, who are more likely to be Leave voters. Bizarrely, at almost exactly the same moment that these findings were released, the very recently-retired former President of YouGov Peter Kellner was expounding his own theory that greater persistence in reaching respondents would have precisely the opposite effect - it would turn up hidden masses of socially liberal people who are more likely to vote Remain.
It was rather amusing to see the personal attack that YouGov's current management then made on Peter Kellner. I seem to recall that whenever I criticised Kellner during the indyref or questioned his motivations, it was cited as evidence that I was plainly an uncivilised cybernat lunatic! It's gratifying to see they've belatedly come around to my way of thinking...
Seriously, though, it's hard to escape the impression that YouGov were casting around for a reason why they as an online pollster might be right and the phone pollsters might be wrong. They homed in on educational attainment and it gave them the results they wanted, but you do have to wonder if they could have magically 'proved' the complete opposite - ie. that phone polls are more accurate - if they had lavished their attention on a different factor instead.
The bottom line is that the uncertainty continues, although two newly-released polls showing a Leave lead obviously has a significant impact on the Poll of Polls. (Both polls are somewhat out of date, but they were mostly conducted within the last three weeks, and therefore qualify for inclusion in the Poll of Polls.)
SCOT GOES POP POLL OF POLLS
50/50 ONLINE/TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 45.5% (-2.3)
Leave 41.0% (-0.7)
ONLINE AVERAGE :
Remain 41.9% (-1.4)
Leave 42.7% (-1.3)
TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 49.0% (-3.3)
Leave 39.2% (-0.1)
(The Poll of Polls takes account of all polls that were conducted at least partly within the last three weeks. The online average is based on seven polls - three from ICM, three from YouGov and one from TNS. The telephone average is based on five polls - one from ICM, one from YouGov, one from ORB, one from Ipsos-Mori and one from ComRes.)
Saturday, May 21, 2016
Friday, May 20, 2016
How might an SNP-Labour pact work in advance of the next UK general election?
The furious reaction of Dunc "don't call me Dunc" Hothersall is probably sufficient to tell you that Keiran Pedley may be on to something in suggesting that, because Labour's only hope of regaining power at UK level depends on a deal with the SNP, it would be better to conclude that deal in advance of a general election and then sell it to the English people. Nothing's inevitable, of course, as the bogus claims of "absolute certainty" about the result of this month's Holyrood election proves. I can just about imagine a scenario in which Labour might return to being competitive in Scotland by 2020 - it would depend on the constitutional issue fading from people's minds, and on Jeremy Corbyn being replaced by a charismatic leader who looks set to sweep the hated Tories from office. In those circumstances, the Scottish electorate's priorities might change. But the overwhelming likelihood is that one of three things will happen -
1) Corbyn will remain leader.
2) Corbyn will be replaced by someone of like mind, such as John McDonnell (who admittedly is more charismatic, but is still regarded as unelectable in England).
3) Corbyn will be replaced by a bland, uninspiring identikit centrist politician in the mould of Ed Miliband or Andy Burnham.
If that's the case, Pedley is surely right in saying that the game's a bogey for Labour in Scotland. But what intrigues me - and what Pedley doesn't address - is the electoral consequences of any deal. If we're talking about a formal pre-election Labour-SNP pact to keep the Tories out, how could the two parties justify putting up candidates against each other? Labour in particular would find it very difficult to pitch for votes in seats that are already held by the SNP - which is virtually every seat in Scotland. Logic would therefore seem to dictate that they should practically sit out the election north of the border.
Ironically, that would probably benefit only the Tories. The former Labour heartlands are highly likely to vote SNP anyway, and the absence of Labour candidates would simply lead to bigger majorities in seats that were never in doubt. But in heavily No-voting areas like the Borders and the rural north-east, the SNP could arguably do with Labour opposition to help split the unionist vote and keep the Tories out.
If an anti-Tory pact isn't going to prove counterproductive, the details are going to need some careful thought.
Crikey! ComRes confounds us with another cracking EU contradiction
This week has been the perfect example of what drives me crazy about people's irrational responses to individual opinion polls. We've had seven EU referendum polls since Monday, and this is what they've shown -
* Five reported a Remain lead.
* Two reported a Leave lead.
* Four reported a swing to Remain.
* Three reported a swing to Leave.
As you can see, the overall picture is as clear as mud, and yet there have been big movements on the currency and betting markets, all apparently attributable to just one of those seven polls - the Ipsos-Mori telephone poll showing the Remain lead surging from ten points to eighteen. Now, to be fair, it's arguable that the trend shown by Ipsos-Mori is more important than the modest progress made by Leave in some of the other polls. If there isn't a dramatic indyref-style convergence between telephone and online polling as we approach referendum day, I would imagine the Leave campaign will be hoping to get to mid-June with a clear lead in online polls, and a deficit of no more than a few points in telephone polls. An eighteen-point lead for Remain in a new telephone poll obviously makes the latter aim seem less likely to be realised, so from that point of view Remain are probably happiest with the new batch of numbers. But there's still no excuse for completely discounting the more Leave-friendly part of the story.
One thing is for sure - online polling this week has entirely failed to corroborate the Ipsos-Mori trend. The ICM and TNS online polls both showed Leave in the lead and a small pro-Leave swing - which perhaps can be explained by normal sampling variation, but certainly can't be easily reconciled with a supposedly massive surge for Remain. The only other online poll was from YouGov, and showed the Remain lead increasing from 2% to 4% - but half of that small increase was an illusion caused by a methodological tweak. Essentially, the state of play was unchanged, which again contradicts Ipsos-Mori.
Even the other telephone polls have provided only limited backing for the Ipsos-Mori narrative. In line with YouGov, the ICM telephone poll on Monday showed a statistically insignificant increase in the Remain lead. The ORB phone poll did show a bigger increase, but as I've noted many times, the trend reported by ORB phone polling has from the start looked suspect, because it's been completely out of line with other data. The latest piece of the jigsaw arrived in the form of a new ComRes phone poll last night, which showed a slight improvement for Leave. That, I would suggest, tips the balance and makes it more likely than not that the Remain surge in the Ipsos-Mori poll was at least somewhat exaggerated.
ComRes have started using their turnout-adjusted model for their headline numbers, which makes a comparison with their previous poll more complicated. Here are two different sets of like-for-like comparisons -
Old methodology :
Remain 51% (n/c)
Leave 41% (+1)
New methodology :
Remain 52% (-1)
Leave 41% (+3)
The swing to Leave on both counts is small and isn't necessarily genuine, but it's unlikely the reported movement would be in that direction if Ipsos-Mori were correct about the Remain lead almost doubling.
So is there any particular reason why the Ipsos-Mori poll might have led us astray? Anthony Wells noticed a couple of striking things about the poll - that the percentage of Tory voters backing Remain was much higher than in other polls, and that a disproportionate amount of the boost for Remain came from mere 'leaners', ie. people who initially said they didn't know how they'd vote, but who opted for Remain when pressed by a follow-up question to say which way they'd be more inclined to vote. Ipsos-Mori include those people in the headline numbers for a good reason - past history shows it makes the results more accurate. But all the same, this referendum is an (almost) unprecedented event, and there's a good deal of uncertainty about the turnout. It could be that many of the Remain leaners found by Ipsos-Mori don't really care that much about the issue, and will be less likely to vote at all. A whopping 83% of the full sample gave a firm opinion on the main voting intention question, which is obviously much, much higher than the eventual turnout is likely to be - and further calls into question whether the others will ever make it to the polling station, regardless of their apparent inclination to favour Remain. But even if the leaners do vote in decent numbers, their opinions clearly look more susceptible to change.
* * *
SCOT GOES POP POLL OF POLLS
50/50 ONLINE/TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 47.8% (+2.0)
Leave 41.7% (+0.4)
ONLINE AVERAGE :
Remain 43.3% (+0.7)
Leave 44.0% (+0.5)
TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 52.3% (+3.3)
Leave 39.3% (+0.3)
(The Poll of Polls takes account of all polls that were conducted at least partly within the last three weeks. The online average is based on nine polls - four from ICM, two from YouGov, one from TNS, one from ORB and one from Opinium. The telephone average is based on four polls - one from ICM, one from ORB, one from Ipsos-Mori and one from ComRes.)
* Five reported a Remain lead.
* Two reported a Leave lead.
* Four reported a swing to Remain.
* Three reported a swing to Leave.
As you can see, the overall picture is as clear as mud, and yet there have been big movements on the currency and betting markets, all apparently attributable to just one of those seven polls - the Ipsos-Mori telephone poll showing the Remain lead surging from ten points to eighteen. Now, to be fair, it's arguable that the trend shown by Ipsos-Mori is more important than the modest progress made by Leave in some of the other polls. If there isn't a dramatic indyref-style convergence between telephone and online polling as we approach referendum day, I would imagine the Leave campaign will be hoping to get to mid-June with a clear lead in online polls, and a deficit of no more than a few points in telephone polls. An eighteen-point lead for Remain in a new telephone poll obviously makes the latter aim seem less likely to be realised, so from that point of view Remain are probably happiest with the new batch of numbers. But there's still no excuse for completely discounting the more Leave-friendly part of the story.
One thing is for sure - online polling this week has entirely failed to corroborate the Ipsos-Mori trend. The ICM and TNS online polls both showed Leave in the lead and a small pro-Leave swing - which perhaps can be explained by normal sampling variation, but certainly can't be easily reconciled with a supposedly massive surge for Remain. The only other online poll was from YouGov, and showed the Remain lead increasing from 2% to 4% - but half of that small increase was an illusion caused by a methodological tweak. Essentially, the state of play was unchanged, which again contradicts Ipsos-Mori.
Even the other telephone polls have provided only limited backing for the Ipsos-Mori narrative. In line with YouGov, the ICM telephone poll on Monday showed a statistically insignificant increase in the Remain lead. The ORB phone poll did show a bigger increase, but as I've noted many times, the trend reported by ORB phone polling has from the start looked suspect, because it's been completely out of line with other data. The latest piece of the jigsaw arrived in the form of a new ComRes phone poll last night, which showed a slight improvement for Leave. That, I would suggest, tips the balance and makes it more likely than not that the Remain surge in the Ipsos-Mori poll was at least somewhat exaggerated.
ComRes have started using their turnout-adjusted model for their headline numbers, which makes a comparison with their previous poll more complicated. Here are two different sets of like-for-like comparisons -
Old methodology :
Remain 51% (n/c)
Leave 41% (+1)
New methodology :
Remain 52% (-1)
Leave 41% (+3)
The swing to Leave on both counts is small and isn't necessarily genuine, but it's unlikely the reported movement would be in that direction if Ipsos-Mori were correct about the Remain lead almost doubling.
So is there any particular reason why the Ipsos-Mori poll might have led us astray? Anthony Wells noticed a couple of striking things about the poll - that the percentage of Tory voters backing Remain was much higher than in other polls, and that a disproportionate amount of the boost for Remain came from mere 'leaners', ie. people who initially said they didn't know how they'd vote, but who opted for Remain when pressed by a follow-up question to say which way they'd be more inclined to vote. Ipsos-Mori include those people in the headline numbers for a good reason - past history shows it makes the results more accurate. But all the same, this referendum is an (almost) unprecedented event, and there's a good deal of uncertainty about the turnout. It could be that many of the Remain leaners found by Ipsos-Mori don't really care that much about the issue, and will be less likely to vote at all. A whopping 83% of the full sample gave a firm opinion on the main voting intention question, which is obviously much, much higher than the eventual turnout is likely to be - and further calls into question whether the others will ever make it to the polling station, regardless of their apparent inclination to favour Remain. But even if the leaners do vote in decent numbers, their opinions clearly look more susceptible to change.
* * *
SCOT GOES POP POLL OF POLLS
50/50 ONLINE/TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 47.8% (+2.0)
Leave 41.7% (+0.4)
ONLINE AVERAGE :
Remain 43.3% (+0.7)
Leave 44.0% (+0.5)
TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 52.3% (+3.3)
Leave 39.3% (+0.3)
(The Poll of Polls takes account of all polls that were conducted at least partly within the last three weeks. The online average is based on nine polls - four from ICM, two from YouGov, one from TNS, one from ORB and one from Opinium. The telephone average is based on four polls - one from ICM, one from ORB, one from Ipsos-Mori and one from ComRes.)
Tuesday, May 17, 2016
Winning With Willie
A real clash of the titans to look forward to as Rennie takes on Sturgeon. Wonder who will win? Should be close. #WinningWithWillie
— James Kelly (@JamesKelly) May 17, 2016
It would be embarrassing if Rennie suffers defeat to Sturgeon by, say, 63 votes to 5. But I'm sure that won't happen. #WinningWithWillie
— James Kelly (@JamesKelly) May 17, 2016
It's absolutely uncanny. In spite of the spectacular progress made by the Liberal Democrats two weeks ago, when they surged from a pathetic 5 seats last time around to a stunning 5 seats this time (prompting the cracking open of champagne and joyous hugs between Willie Rennie and Tim Farron), I somehow just had this weird feeling - call it a premonition - that Rennie's bid to become First Minister would all go horribly wrong and he would lose to the SNP's Nicola Sturgeon by a humiliating margin of 63 votes to 5. It seemed so improbable, and yet I should have trusted the nagging voice inside my head, because that's exactly what happened.
Election of First Minister :
Nicola Sturgeon (SNP) : 63 votes
Willie Rennie (Lib Dem) : 5 votes
Nicola Sturgeon re-elected as First Minister by a margin of 58 votes.
But give Rennie his due - at least he gave us an election. Ruth Davidson, by contrast, didn't make our day - she ran away. I couldn't help but smile at this rather charitable interpretation of her decision on the BBC website...
"Ms Davidson will not stand this time, after pledging during the election campaign to form a strong opposition."
That implied, somewhat amusingly, that the only reason Davidson wasn't putting herself forward as First Minister was because it would be a breach of a clear manifesto commitment that she wouldn't try to get elected. I felt sure that she wouldn't be mad enough to attempt that excuse herself - after all, you can't control how many people vote for you, so what would she have done if there had been a Conservative majority? Would she have instructed half her parliamentary party to resign immediately? Or would she have voted for Nicola Sturgeon just so that she could have the SNP government she promised to oppose? It gives a whole new meaning to the phrase "Vote Tory, get SNP".
But yes, bizarre though it may seem, Davidson confirmed in her speech that she wasn't trying to get elected because she had promised to be the opposition. The mind boggles.
* * *
EU referendum polls are like the proverbial London buses - you wait a whole week for one, and then four turn up at once. Since the two ICM polls were released yesterday afternoon, we've had another two from other firms...
Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?
TNS poll (online) :
Remain 38% (-1)
Leave 41% (+5)
ORB poll (telephone) :
Remain 55% (+4)
Leave 40% (-3)
Remain activists were getting very excited about the ORB poll last night, but I'm not really sure what to make of it. The trend shown by ORB phone polls has been as mad as a bucket of frogs, and so far hasn't borne any resemblance to what phone polls from other firms have been reporting. When we have three polls from other firms conducted at around the same time (including a phone poll from ICM) all showing either a steady picture or slight progress for Leave, I think we have to be a bit sceptical about the ORB findings. It's not completely impossible that they're just ahead of the game in picking up a Remain surge earlier than other firms, but we'll just have to wait for more information to find out.
The other slightly irritating thing about ORB phone polls is that it's never entirely clear which set of figures should be treated as the headline figures. The Telegraph, who commission the polls, usually seem to give more emphasis to the turnout-filtered figures - which in this case are much more favourable for Leave (51% Remain, 45% Leave).
* * *
SCOT GOES POP POLL OF POLLS
50/50 ONLINE/TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 45.8% (+1.2)
Leave 41.3% (+0.1)
ONLINE AVERAGE :
Remain 42.6% (-0.5)
Leave 43.5% (-0.3)
TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 49.0% (+3.0)
Leave 39.0% (+0.5)
(The Poll of Polls takes account of all polls that were conducted at least partly within the last three weeks. The online average is based on eleven polls - four from ICM, two from YouGov, two from TNS, one from ORB, one from BMG and one from Opinium. The telephone average is based on three polls - one from ICM, one from ORB and one from Survation.)
Monday, May 16, 2016
Get set for Schrodinger's referendum as bombshell ICM poll reveals that Remain and Leave are both winning
After a whole week without a single EU referendum poll (almost unbelievable this deep into the campaign), ICM have broken the drought with simultaneous phone and online polls, which once again show the traditional disparity. It looks like public opinion hasn't budged much - the phone poll shows a statistically insignificant one-point increase in the Remain lead, and although the 4% Leave lead in the online poll is unusually high, it's still within the normal range when you take account of the fact that ICM made a couple of Leave-friendly tweaks to their online methodology a few weeks ago.
Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?
Online poll :
Remain 43% (-1)
Leave 47% (+1)
Phone poll :
Remain 47% (-1)
Leave 39% (-2)
In line with the Kevin Williamson theory that opinion polls are always 100% accurate and that voters never, ever change their minds as an election approaches (as long as Boris Johnson isn't photographed with a copy of The Sun, naturally), we now know the result of the vote on June 23rd. Remain are going to win the phone referendum, and Leave are going to win the online referendum. It remains to be seen who will win the paper and pencil referendum, though, and come to think of it, that could be quite important.
Intriguingly, Martin Boon of ICM has parted company with his counterparts in ComRes, and also with Matt Singh of the Number Cruncher website, by disputing the assumption that the Remain-friendly phone polls are likely to prove more accurate. Matt Singh's reasoning on that point has always seemed a little suspect to me - for example, he prayed in aid the fact that online polls overestimated the UKIP vote in the May 5th elections (including the Scottish Parliament election), but it could well be that turnout patterns are going to be radically different next month. The EU referendum is the ultimate 'home fixture' for UKIP supporters, and it's not hard to see why they would be considerably less motivated to go out to vote in a Holyrood contest.
* * *
SCOT GOES POP POLL OF POLLS
50/50 ONLINE/TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 44.6% (n/c)
Leave 41.2% (+1.5)
ONLINE AVERAGE :
Remain 43.1% (+3.5)
Leave 43.8% (+4.7)
TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 46.0% (-3.5)
Leave 38.5% (-1.8)
(The Poll of Polls takes account of all polls that were conducted at least partly within the last three weeks. The online average is based on ten polls - four from ICM, two from YouGov, one from ORB, one from TNS, one from BMG and one from Opinium. The telephone average is based on two polls - one from ICM and one from Survation.)
Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?
Online poll :
Remain 43% (-1)
Leave 47% (+1)
Phone poll :
Remain 47% (-1)
Leave 39% (-2)
In line with the Kevin Williamson theory that opinion polls are always 100% accurate and that voters never, ever change their minds as an election approaches (as long as Boris Johnson isn't photographed with a copy of The Sun, naturally), we now know the result of the vote on June 23rd. Remain are going to win the phone referendum, and Leave are going to win the online referendum. It remains to be seen who will win the paper and pencil referendum, though, and come to think of it, that could be quite important.
Intriguingly, Martin Boon of ICM has parted company with his counterparts in ComRes, and also with Matt Singh of the Number Cruncher website, by disputing the assumption that the Remain-friendly phone polls are likely to prove more accurate. Matt Singh's reasoning on that point has always seemed a little suspect to me - for example, he prayed in aid the fact that online polls overestimated the UKIP vote in the May 5th elections (including the Scottish Parliament election), but it could well be that turnout patterns are going to be radically different next month. The EU referendum is the ultimate 'home fixture' for UKIP supporters, and it's not hard to see why they would be considerably less motivated to go out to vote in a Holyrood contest.
* * *
SCOT GOES POP POLL OF POLLS
50/50 ONLINE/TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 44.6% (n/c)
Leave 41.2% (+1.5)
ONLINE AVERAGE :
Remain 43.1% (+3.5)
Leave 43.8% (+4.7)
TELEPHONE AVERAGE :
Remain 46.0% (-3.5)
Leave 38.5% (-1.8)
(The Poll of Polls takes account of all polls that were conducted at least partly within the last three weeks. The online average is based on ten polls - four from ICM, two from YouGov, one from ORB, one from TNS, one from BMG and one from Opinium. The telephone average is based on two polls - one from ICM and one from Survation.)
Sunday, May 15, 2016
A few thoughts on the Tory/Labour plan to legalise sectarian abuse at football matches
It's been suggested today that because the SNP won a clear mandate at the Holyrood election, it's wrong for the opposition parties to press for the repeal of the Offensive Behaviour at Football Act. It may surprise you to hear that I don't agree with that line of argument. In this particular case (and it's a very rare one), a tiny majority of MSPs with a vote - 65 out of 128, or 50.8% - were elected under the banner of a party that opposes one specific SNP policy. If those MSPs want to attempt to use that numerical edge to reverse the policy, there's no democratic problem there - quite the reverse, in fact. But the operative word is "attempt". There's a fair chance this episode may actually end up demonstrating just how strong the SNP's arithmetical position is. The opposition parties will need total discipline across four party groups who agree on little else and who don't particularly like each other - and that will only get them to 65 votes. By contrast, the SNP group is cohesive and should easily be able to turn out 63 votes. There's very little margin for error as far as the opposition are concerned, and the devil is often in the detail. At this stage, the smart money should probably be on the Act remaining in force.
Kelly-speak to English translation : The SNP used the overwhelming mandate they received at the 2011 election to outvote the losing parties. This is in line with what majority governments are typically expected to do. Presumably Kelly thinks the Attlee government shouldn't have used its 1945 mandate to establish the National Health Service, but should have been less "arrogant" and entered into a compromise with the Tories instead. But hey, a 10% discount on medical bills would be almost as good as a free NHS, right?
However, if by any chance the repeal attempt succeeds, the Tories and Labour are quite right to say that we have to accept that there is a 65-63 mandate for that to happen, albeit a complicated four-party mandate. But the principle cuts both ways. The 69-59 mandate given to the two main pro-independence parties is of course considerably less complicated and much more emphatic (one might almost say "decisive"). I therefore look forward to the unionist parties displaying their customary logical consistency, and showing the same respect for democracy that they demand of us.
By the way, my popular Labour MSP namesake has made this mind-boggling observation on the subject -
"Labour will work [with] other parties in the Scottish Parliament to repeal the Football Act. The law has become a symbol of the SNP's arrogance in government. No other party supported the law but the SNP used their majority to bulldoze it through anyway."
"Labour will work [with] other parties in the Scottish Parliament to repeal the Football Act. The law has become a symbol of the SNP's arrogance in government. No other party supported the law but the SNP used their majority to bulldoze it through anyway."
Kelly-speak to English translation : The SNP used the overwhelming mandate they received at the 2011 election to outvote the losing parties. This is in line with what majority governments are typically expected to do. Presumably Kelly thinks the Attlee government shouldn't have used its 1945 mandate to establish the National Health Service, but should have been less "arrogant" and entered into a compromise with the Tories instead. But hey, a 10% discount on medical bills would be almost as good as a free NHS, right?
Thunder and lightning, it's getting exciting
I knew that the sight of Australia racking up a huge Eurovision lead on jury votes, but losing it all on the public vote, reminded me of something. It took me a while to put my finger on it, but of course it was the SNP totally dominating the constituency vote in the Holyrood election, before the list vote didn't work out quite so well thanks to flippin' tactical...well, you get the picture. But at least Nicola Sturgeon still won the election by a country mile - there's no such solace for the Aussies tonight.
Normally when one country is 100 points ahead, and the host says "but everything can still change", it provokes little more than a weary and hollow laugh. In fact that was probably the case tonight, because I don't think anyone really thought Australia could be caught, but the new points system worked its magic better than we could have dreamed. It won't always be like this - often in the Melodifestivalen (where the system is borrowed from) the juries and public are in agreement. But a split decision is probably more likely to occur at the Eurovision, simply because the public vote is always heavily distorted by neighbourly bloc voting.
From the point of view of my own prediction, it was a slightly irritating final outcome, because I got so many things right, and yet I still somehow contrived to get the overall winner wrong. I correctly predicted that Australia would win the jury vote and would do reasonably well on the public vote. I was also correct that Russia would be hammered by the juries but would win the public vote. But what I didn't foresee was that a third country would come through the middle by finishing second on both the jury and public votes, and in particular I didn't foresee that the country that would do that was Ukraine. They were doing pretty well in the betting, and some Eurovision bloggers predicted they would win, but no matter how many times I listened to the song, I just couldn't see it happening. I thought it was too dark and complex to do well on the public vote (even allowing for Ukraine's in-built advantage courtesy of the ex-Soviet bloc vote), and I wasn't even 100% convinced that the juries would like it. I suppose part of the explanation is the emotion in the performance, although even that didn't come across as fully as it might have done if the song had been entirely in English.
But I can't say I'm disappointed - I would have preferred Australia, but the most important thing is that a credible, non-formulaic song won out over Russia's derivative effort. (And of course if Australia had won, the contest would have faced credibility problems of an entirely different sort.)
Graham Norton is a great commentator, but I do think he got a bit of deserved comeuppance tonight after repeatedly slating the Georgian song and saying it was baffling that it had made it through to the final when Ireland hadn't. (It really, really wasn't baffling at all.) He clearly wasn't sure quite how to react when the UK jury, comprised entirely of music professionals who presumably know their stuff, gave Georgia the maximum twelve points! Norton also isn't quite as sharp as Terry Wogan used to be in his observations on the voting. In this case, he was reading far too much into the lack of political voting among the juries, which actually isn't a great surprise if you look at the voting patterns prior to telephone voting being introduced in the late 1990s. Greece and Cyprus used to swap twelve points as a matter of routine, but that was pretty much it - there was no reliable Nordic bloc vote, or anything like that. There also shouldn't have been any surprise tonight that the UK did much less well on the public vote than with the juries - that's been a fairly consistent pattern in recent years, although until now it hasn't been quite so visible.
There used to be a tradition at the Olympics that the IOC president would finish his remarks in the closing ceremony by declaring the latest edition of the Games "the best ever". I think the EBU could be forgiven for making an equivalent boast tonight. I don't think the contest has ever been as well hosted, the jokes were actually funny rather than cringe-inducing (which is almost unheard of), the climax of the voting was a thriller (which has been rare of late), and the quality of the music was pretty high (by Eurovision standards, I mean, which is the only test that can be meaningfully applied). It really was the complete package - no complaints at all.
Normally when one country is 100 points ahead, and the host says "but everything can still change", it provokes little more than a weary and hollow laugh. In fact that was probably the case tonight, because I don't think anyone really thought Australia could be caught, but the new points system worked its magic better than we could have dreamed. It won't always be like this - often in the Melodifestivalen (where the system is borrowed from) the juries and public are in agreement. But a split decision is probably more likely to occur at the Eurovision, simply because the public vote is always heavily distorted by neighbourly bloc voting.
From the point of view of my own prediction, it was a slightly irritating final outcome, because I got so many things right, and yet I still somehow contrived to get the overall winner wrong. I correctly predicted that Australia would win the jury vote and would do reasonably well on the public vote. I was also correct that Russia would be hammered by the juries but would win the public vote. But what I didn't foresee was that a third country would come through the middle by finishing second on both the jury and public votes, and in particular I didn't foresee that the country that would do that was Ukraine. They were doing pretty well in the betting, and some Eurovision bloggers predicted they would win, but no matter how many times I listened to the song, I just couldn't see it happening. I thought it was too dark and complex to do well on the public vote (even allowing for Ukraine's in-built advantage courtesy of the ex-Soviet bloc vote), and I wasn't even 100% convinced that the juries would like it. I suppose part of the explanation is the emotion in the performance, although even that didn't come across as fully as it might have done if the song had been entirely in English.
But I can't say I'm disappointed - I would have preferred Australia, but the most important thing is that a credible, non-formulaic song won out over Russia's derivative effort. (And of course if Australia had won, the contest would have faced credibility problems of an entirely different sort.)
Graham Norton is a great commentator, but I do think he got a bit of deserved comeuppance tonight after repeatedly slating the Georgian song and saying it was baffling that it had made it through to the final when Ireland hadn't. (It really, really wasn't baffling at all.) He clearly wasn't sure quite how to react when the UK jury, comprised entirely of music professionals who presumably know their stuff, gave Georgia the maximum twelve points! Norton also isn't quite as sharp as Terry Wogan used to be in his observations on the voting. In this case, he was reading far too much into the lack of political voting among the juries, which actually isn't a great surprise if you look at the voting patterns prior to telephone voting being introduced in the late 1990s. Greece and Cyprus used to swap twelve points as a matter of routine, but that was pretty much it - there was no reliable Nordic bloc vote, or anything like that. There also shouldn't have been any surprise tonight that the UK did much less well on the public vote than with the juries - that's been a fairly consistent pattern in recent years, although until now it hasn't been quite so visible.
There used to be a tradition at the Olympics that the IOC president would finish his remarks in the closing ceremony by declaring the latest edition of the Games "the best ever". I think the EBU could be forgiven for making an equivalent boast tonight. I don't think the contest has ever been as well hosted, the jokes were actually funny rather than cringe-inducing (which is almost unheard of), the climax of the voting was a thriller (which has been rare of late), and the quality of the music was pretty high (by Eurovision standards, I mean, which is the only test that can be meaningfully applied). It really was the complete package - no complaints at all.
Saturday, May 14, 2016
Eurovision 2016 : prediction for Saturday's grand final
Well, this is all getting rather uncanny - I correctly predicted all ten qualifiers from the second semi-final, after getting the first one mostly right as well. I'm bound to come a cropper at the final hurdle, but here goes anyway.
The majority of hot favourites at the Eurovision end up winning, but some narrowly fall short, and a significant minority end up on the bottom half of the scoreboard (as happened to France in 2011, for example). I don't think the latter fate will befall the Russian song this year, but I do think it's a relatively weak favourite by recent standards. For all the similarities to the winner from twelve months ago, it's formulaic and derivative where its predecessor was fresh and creative. I find it hard to believe that the juries will place it top, so the big question is whether it'll at least be in the game at the end of jury voting. If it's in the top three at that point, there must be a very good chance that the pro-Russian bloc in the televoting will push it to victory. In fact, here's a betting tip, if you're that way inclined - if by any chance the juries do have Russia in first place, pretty much any in-play odds on Russia to win would be worth taking, because it'll be about as close to free money as you'll ever get.
However, I have a sneaking suspicion that Russia may take a real pounding with the juries, in which case the song favoured by the juries would probably only need to finish second in the televoting to be guaranteed of victory. The snag is, though, that jury voting is much harder to read in advance than televoting, and so it's hard to know for sure which song is most likely to emerge from the pack. All I can say is that my own view after watching the semi-finals (and also some of the rehearsal footage) is that Australia have the strongest song in the contest, and they definitely have the finest singer. So logically I have to conclude that the juries would be most likely to plump for Australia, a song which I also think could do reasonably well in the televoting. Without an enormous amount of conviction, then, I'm predicting an Australian victory.
One obvious problem with trying to work out whether the conventional wisdom overestimates or underestimates a song's chances is that personal taste can interfere with the radar. In this case, my instinct is that France, Ukraine and Sweden have been overestimated and that Belgium, Malta and Bulgaria have been slightly underestimated. But I watched the whole of the Melodifestivalen final and was baffled by the winner, so it could be that I'm missing something about the Swedish song that most other people can see. Perhaps I'll be surprised again, but I'm going to stick with my gut feeling and say that it'll be outside the top five. I'm more confident in predicting that France will fall short of expectations - I like the song a lot, but I just don't see anything at all in it that will make it stand out. It's the sort of entry that has finished a routine fifteenth in previous contests, so I'm not quite sure what all the fuss has been about.
My initial feeling after Thursday's semi was that Belgium might be headed for the top three, but their hopes have taken a slight hit after being placed right at the start of the running-order. But first is better than second, and it's so different from everything that'll come afterwards that people will probably still remember it by the end of the show. Conversely, the Maltese song won't stand out as much, but it's extremely well performed and has an enviable draw. I expect Bulgaria to be in the mix because the juries will probably recognise its quality - I'm not so sure how it will fare with the public, though.
So this is my best guess as to how it will shake out -
Winners : Australia (Sound of Silence - Dami Im)
2nd : Russia (You Are the Only One - Sergey Lazarev)
3rd : Malta (Walk on Water - Ira Losco)
4th : Belgium (What's the Pressure - Laura Tesoro)
5th : Bulgaria (If Love Was a Crime - Poli Genova)
Possible dark horses : Israel, Netherlands, Italy
If Australia do win, in one sense it'll be great for the contest, because musical quality will have unexpectedly won out over the do-it-by-numbers approach. But in another sense it'll be a bad outcome, because it'll draw attention to the fact that the contest's status as a European event has been hopelessly undermined over the last couple of years. I haven't bothered to check this year's rules in relation to Australia, but I presume it's still the case that if they win, they won't be allowed to host the contest next year, and will instead have to pick a European country to 'partner' with. That may be the UK's only hope of hosting the Eurovision in the foreseeable future, although I have a feeling Australia might want to avoid any impression of mutual Anglo-Saxon back-scratching, and would go for a more left-field choice instead.
By the way, I'll be voting for Austria. The decision has been made for me. I have a personal rule that I only vote for songs performed entirely in a language other in English, and Austria is literally the only one left!
The majority of hot favourites at the Eurovision end up winning, but some narrowly fall short, and a significant minority end up on the bottom half of the scoreboard (as happened to France in 2011, for example). I don't think the latter fate will befall the Russian song this year, but I do think it's a relatively weak favourite by recent standards. For all the similarities to the winner from twelve months ago, it's formulaic and derivative where its predecessor was fresh and creative. I find it hard to believe that the juries will place it top, so the big question is whether it'll at least be in the game at the end of jury voting. If it's in the top three at that point, there must be a very good chance that the pro-Russian bloc in the televoting will push it to victory. In fact, here's a betting tip, if you're that way inclined - if by any chance the juries do have Russia in first place, pretty much any in-play odds on Russia to win would be worth taking, because it'll be about as close to free money as you'll ever get.
However, I have a sneaking suspicion that Russia may take a real pounding with the juries, in which case the song favoured by the juries would probably only need to finish second in the televoting to be guaranteed of victory. The snag is, though, that jury voting is much harder to read in advance than televoting, and so it's hard to know for sure which song is most likely to emerge from the pack. All I can say is that my own view after watching the semi-finals (and also some of the rehearsal footage) is that Australia have the strongest song in the contest, and they definitely have the finest singer. So logically I have to conclude that the juries would be most likely to plump for Australia, a song which I also think could do reasonably well in the televoting. Without an enormous amount of conviction, then, I'm predicting an Australian victory.
One obvious problem with trying to work out whether the conventional wisdom overestimates or underestimates a song's chances is that personal taste can interfere with the radar. In this case, my instinct is that France, Ukraine and Sweden have been overestimated and that Belgium, Malta and Bulgaria have been slightly underestimated. But I watched the whole of the Melodifestivalen final and was baffled by the winner, so it could be that I'm missing something about the Swedish song that most other people can see. Perhaps I'll be surprised again, but I'm going to stick with my gut feeling and say that it'll be outside the top five. I'm more confident in predicting that France will fall short of expectations - I like the song a lot, but I just don't see anything at all in it that will make it stand out. It's the sort of entry that has finished a routine fifteenth in previous contests, so I'm not quite sure what all the fuss has been about.
My initial feeling after Thursday's semi was that Belgium might be headed for the top three, but their hopes have taken a slight hit after being placed right at the start of the running-order. But first is better than second, and it's so different from everything that'll come afterwards that people will probably still remember it by the end of the show. Conversely, the Maltese song won't stand out as much, but it's extremely well performed and has an enviable draw. I expect Bulgaria to be in the mix because the juries will probably recognise its quality - I'm not so sure how it will fare with the public, though.
So this is my best guess as to how it will shake out -
Winners : Australia (Sound of Silence - Dami Im)
2nd : Russia (You Are the Only One - Sergey Lazarev)
3rd : Malta (Walk on Water - Ira Losco)
4th : Belgium (What's the Pressure - Laura Tesoro)
5th : Bulgaria (If Love Was a Crime - Poli Genova)
Possible dark horses : Israel, Netherlands, Italy
If Australia do win, in one sense it'll be great for the contest, because musical quality will have unexpectedly won out over the do-it-by-numbers approach. But in another sense it'll be a bad outcome, because it'll draw attention to the fact that the contest's status as a European event has been hopelessly undermined over the last couple of years. I haven't bothered to check this year's rules in relation to Australia, but I presume it's still the case that if they win, they won't be allowed to host the contest next year, and will instead have to pick a European country to 'partner' with. That may be the UK's only hope of hosting the Eurovision in the foreseeable future, although I have a feeling Australia might want to avoid any impression of mutual Anglo-Saxon back-scratching, and would go for a more left-field choice instead.
By the way, I'll be voting for Austria. The decision has been made for me. I have a personal rule that I only vote for songs performed entirely in a language other in English, and Austria is literally the only one left!
Friday, May 13, 2016
James Mackenzie : "As I correctly predicted...er...oh wait..."
You've got to hand it to the Greens' former PR man James Mackenzie, he's brazen if nothing else. He's updated his Better Nation blog for only the second time since October (so it's probably safe to say that something is really bugging him), and his main aim seems to be to convince us all that his pre-election "predictions" about wasted SNP list votes were not in fact the cynically misleading propaganda claims that the election result demonstrated them to be, but were somehow proved accurate. Specifically, he prays in aid this tweet about the final Ipsos-Mori poll of the campaign in late April -
"And, as with previous polls, this would see the SNP win list seats only in Highlands and Islands and South."
Which, of course, sounds uncannily accurate unless you bother to take the obvious step of checking what came before the "and"...
"The three questions for this election would be answered thus: another SNP majority, Tories beating Labour, Greens beating Lib Dems."
Ah. I see. So the whole basis for Mackenzie's "prediction" that the SNP would not win list seats in six out of eight regions was that they would win an overall majority on constituency seats alone. To state the bleedin' obvious, that isn't even close to what actually happened. In reality, the SNP fell well short of winning 65 constituency seats - but they would have been compensated for that on the list if their share of the list vote had help up. Instead, it fell. With 44% of the list vote in 2011, the SNP were topped up with list seats until they reached 69 seats overall. With 42% of the list vote in 2016, they were only topped up to 63 seats - two short of a majority. That small drop made a big difference. And why did it happen? Ooooh, we can only speculate, but one obvious possibility is the sustained propaganda campaign (from the Greens, RISE, Solidarity, and parts of both the mainstream and alternative media) that sought to persuade people that SNP list votes would be wasted no matter how many of them there were.
Mackenzie can huff and puff about "correctly predicting" that the SNP would fail to win list seats in six out of eight regions, but the reality is that this was an aim successfully realised, not a passive prediction. None of us ever said that the SNP would win a barrel-load of list seats if there weren't enough SNP list votes. The whole point we were making is that there was a path to an SNP overall majority, even without 65 constituency seats - but only if enough people voted SNP on the list. A comparison between the 2011 and 2016 results demonstrates that point to be indisputably true. Mackenzie and others used the false claims about the voting system to successfully reduce the SNP list vote and to strip Nicola Sturgeon of her overall majority. No-one can doubt that he's extremely pleased about doing that, because it was in his own party's best interests, but is he proud of misleading people to get what he wanted? I suspect he probably is, actually. For an ideological zealot like Mackenzie (I've never come across anyone else quite like him in Scottish politics), the end often justifies the means.
Elsewhere, he completely misrepresents the concerns that have been raised about the Edinburgh Central result -
"There’s been a moderate amount of mumping and moaning from the wilder fringes of Nat-dom online about the Greens’ candidacy in Edinburgh Central. Those were our 4,644 votes, they say, and we’d have held Central if the Greens hadn’t stood the wonderful Alison Johnstone."
Sorry, but who the hell has been saying that the Greens' votes in Edinburgh Central were "ours"? The only claim I've heard anyone make is one that is, again, utterly indisputable - that if the Greens had followed exactly the same practice in Edinburgh Central that they did in virtually every other constituency in Scotland, Ruth Davidson would not have been elected a constituency MSP (thus depriving the Tories of a propaganda coup), and the SNP would have been only one seat short of a majority, not two. And as it happens, we wouldn't have been deprived of Alison Johnstone's "wonderfulness" anyway, because she would still have been elected on the list. It was perfectly legitimate for the Greens to stand a candidate wherever they liked and for whatever reason they liked, but it's a cop-out for them not to acknowledge that the decision to stand in that particular constituency has had certain consequences for the pro-independence movement. Perhaps they feel that an election is every man or woman for themselves, and every party for itself - but if they do feel that, why did they spend so much time lecturing SNP voters about putting the movement first by switching to a different party on the list? They really can't have it both ways.
Incidentally, don't even bother to alert Mackenzie to this blogpost. He won't address the substance of what I've said - he'll just boast that he isn't going to read it, but then still attempt to delegitimise it as the ramblings of a "misogynistic Wings-loving tube/zoomer/rocket". If you've ever wondered why dyed-in-the-wool left-wingers like myself would think twice about voting Green even if the SNP didn't exist, look no further than the abusive Mr Mackenzie.
* * *
UPDATE : In the comments section below, someone has objected to the notion that the RISE/Solidarity end of the propaganda campaign could possibly have contributed to the loss of the SNP's majority, because RISE and Solidarity "didn't actually receive any votes". This is another myth that needs to be knocked on the head. As poorly as they performed, those two parties in combination received 1.1% of the list vote - up from 0.6% five years ago. The SNP's list vote only fell by 2.3%, so the vote-splitting message from the radical left can conceivably explain a fair chunk of that drop.
* * *
Kezia Dugdale has called upon the SNP to make a positive case for remaining in Europe, instead of complaining about the UK government making a negative case. Today I'm calling on Kezia Dugdale to make a positive case about why the SNP are bad, rather than complaining about the SNP's complaints.
* * *
There's talk that the Leave campaign are deeply unhappy that Nigel Farage has been invited to put the anti-EU case in two high-profile TV debates, and that's entirely understandable. Even when George Galloway took part in the indyref debate in the Hydro and made the fraudulent promise of "Devo Super Max" if Scotland voted No, he did so (incredibly) as the official nominated representative of Better Together. So it does seem odd that the designated Leave campaign can't choose its own spokespeople for the most important debates. But what I find most interesting is Farage's own motivation for taking up the invites. It must be one of two things - either a) he doesn't care about losing the referendum as long as his own profile is boosted, or b) he genuinely doesn't have enough self-awareness to realise that Leave is less likely to win if he refuses to take a back seat.
"And, as with previous polls, this would see the SNP win list seats only in Highlands and Islands and South."
Which, of course, sounds uncannily accurate unless you bother to take the obvious step of checking what came before the "and"...
"The three questions for this election would be answered thus: another SNP majority, Tories beating Labour, Greens beating Lib Dems."
Ah. I see. So the whole basis for Mackenzie's "prediction" that the SNP would not win list seats in six out of eight regions was that they would win an overall majority on constituency seats alone. To state the bleedin' obvious, that isn't even close to what actually happened. In reality, the SNP fell well short of winning 65 constituency seats - but they would have been compensated for that on the list if their share of the list vote had help up. Instead, it fell. With 44% of the list vote in 2011, the SNP were topped up with list seats until they reached 69 seats overall. With 42% of the list vote in 2016, they were only topped up to 63 seats - two short of a majority. That small drop made a big difference. And why did it happen? Ooooh, we can only speculate, but one obvious possibility is the sustained propaganda campaign (from the Greens, RISE, Solidarity, and parts of both the mainstream and alternative media) that sought to persuade people that SNP list votes would be wasted no matter how many of them there were.
Mackenzie can huff and puff about "correctly predicting" that the SNP would fail to win list seats in six out of eight regions, but the reality is that this was an aim successfully realised, not a passive prediction. None of us ever said that the SNP would win a barrel-load of list seats if there weren't enough SNP list votes. The whole point we were making is that there was a path to an SNP overall majority, even without 65 constituency seats - but only if enough people voted SNP on the list. A comparison between the 2011 and 2016 results demonstrates that point to be indisputably true. Mackenzie and others used the false claims about the voting system to successfully reduce the SNP list vote and to strip Nicola Sturgeon of her overall majority. No-one can doubt that he's extremely pleased about doing that, because it was in his own party's best interests, but is he proud of misleading people to get what he wanted? I suspect he probably is, actually. For an ideological zealot like Mackenzie (I've never come across anyone else quite like him in Scottish politics), the end often justifies the means.
Elsewhere, he completely misrepresents the concerns that have been raised about the Edinburgh Central result -
"There’s been a moderate amount of mumping and moaning from the wilder fringes of Nat-dom online about the Greens’ candidacy in Edinburgh Central. Those were our 4,644 votes, they say, and we’d have held Central if the Greens hadn’t stood the wonderful Alison Johnstone."
Sorry, but who the hell has been saying that the Greens' votes in Edinburgh Central were "ours"? The only claim I've heard anyone make is one that is, again, utterly indisputable - that if the Greens had followed exactly the same practice in Edinburgh Central that they did in virtually every other constituency in Scotland, Ruth Davidson would not have been elected a constituency MSP (thus depriving the Tories of a propaganda coup), and the SNP would have been only one seat short of a majority, not two. And as it happens, we wouldn't have been deprived of Alison Johnstone's "wonderfulness" anyway, because she would still have been elected on the list. It was perfectly legitimate for the Greens to stand a candidate wherever they liked and for whatever reason they liked, but it's a cop-out for them not to acknowledge that the decision to stand in that particular constituency has had certain consequences for the pro-independence movement. Perhaps they feel that an election is every man or woman for themselves, and every party for itself - but if they do feel that, why did they spend so much time lecturing SNP voters about putting the movement first by switching to a different party on the list? They really can't have it both ways.
Incidentally, don't even bother to alert Mackenzie to this blogpost. He won't address the substance of what I've said - he'll just boast that he isn't going to read it, but then still attempt to delegitimise it as the ramblings of a "misogynistic Wings-loving tube/zoomer/rocket". If you've ever wondered why dyed-in-the-wool left-wingers like myself would think twice about voting Green even if the SNP didn't exist, look no further than the abusive Mr Mackenzie.
* * *
UPDATE : In the comments section below, someone has objected to the notion that the RISE/Solidarity end of the propaganda campaign could possibly have contributed to the loss of the SNP's majority, because RISE and Solidarity "didn't actually receive any votes". This is another myth that needs to be knocked on the head. As poorly as they performed, those two parties in combination received 1.1% of the list vote - up from 0.6% five years ago. The SNP's list vote only fell by 2.3%, so the vote-splitting message from the radical left can conceivably explain a fair chunk of that drop.
* * *
Kezia Dugdale has called upon the SNP to make a positive case for remaining in Europe, instead of complaining about the UK government making a negative case. Today I'm calling on Kezia Dugdale to make a positive case about why the SNP are bad, rather than complaining about the SNP's complaints.
* * *
There's talk that the Leave campaign are deeply unhappy that Nigel Farage has been invited to put the anti-EU case in two high-profile TV debates, and that's entirely understandable. Even when George Galloway took part in the indyref debate in the Hydro and made the fraudulent promise of "Devo Super Max" if Scotland voted No, he did so (incredibly) as the official nominated representative of Better Together. So it does seem odd that the designated Leave campaign can't choose its own spokespeople for the most important debates. But what I find most interesting is Farage's own motivation for taking up the invites. It must be one of two things - either a) he doesn't care about losing the referendum as long as his own profile is boosted, or b) he genuinely doesn't have enough self-awareness to realise that Leave is less likely to win if he refuses to take a back seat.
Thursday, May 12, 2016
Eurovision 2016 : Prediction for Thursday's semi-final
After my success in correctly predicting nine out of ten qualifiers in the first semi, let's see how spectacularly I can fall from grace in round two. Here are the ten countries I think will make it through tonight...
Ukraine
Latvia
Serbia
Bulgaria
Israel
Australia
Belgium
Poland
Lithuania
Georgia
I couldn't make up my mind between Georgia, FYR Macedonia and Norway for the final spot. I almost plumped for FYR Macedonia on the basis that they usually get through even when their song isn't up to much, but then I realised that they don't really have many neighbours voting tonight - just Serbia and Albania (although admittedly that could still make all the difference).
Once again, I'll be looking out for a live performance strong enough to challenge Russia in the grand final. The only one that leapt out at me as a possibility on Tuesday night was Malta (and you can guarantee Ira Losco will wangle a few bonus votes from being a) pregnant and b) the girl who was robbed in 2002).
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